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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jorgensen appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it his probation, or, alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua 
sponte, when it did so. part of his -:>nvu;:::,,c:, requested the production of various 
transcripts, but the Idaho Supreme Court his motion to augment the appellate 
record with those transcripts. Mr. Jorgensen contends this constitutes a violation of his 
state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, 
this Court should grant Mr. Jorgensen access the requested transcripts and allow him 
the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from of 
those transcripts. In the event that request is denied, this Court should vacate the 
district court's order revoking his probation and executing his sentence and remand this 
case for a new disposition hearing. Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Jorgensen's 
sentence as it deems appropriate. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Jorgensen pied guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), which had been reduced from delivery of a 
controlled substance. (R., pp.47-49.) The State agreed to recommend probation. 
(R., pp.47-49.) The presentence investigator also recommended that Mr. Jorgensen be 
placed on probation, as this was his first felony offense, he had been able to maintain 
consistent employment, and he was willing to participate in treatment. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3, 6, 8.) The matter progressed to a 
sentencing hearing, where the minutes indicate that Mr. Jorgensen had some concerns 
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about proceeding at that time. (R., p.72.) The minutes do not indicate how, or even 
whether, those concerns were addressed. 1 generally , pp.72-74.) Ultimately, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, which it suspended for a four-year period of probation.2 (R., p.73.) 
Approximately one year later, the State filed a report of probation violation. 
(R., pp.95-96.) Mr. Jorgensen admitted all but one of the alleged violations (which 
the State subsequently dismissed). (R., pp.100-02.) The district court revoked 
Mr. Jorgensen's probation, but retained jurisdiction, expecting that Mr. Jorgensen would 
be able to participate in a rider program. (R., p. ·101.) When Mr. Jorgensen informed the 
district court that had spent 120 days waiting transported to the rider facility, 
the district court decided to return Mr. Jorgensen to probation. (R., p.112-15.) 
Two years later, the State filed a second report of probation violation. 
(R., pp.118-20.) That report indicated that Mr. Jorgensen may have absconded 
supervision. (R., pp.119.) Nevertheless, that report recommended that Mr. Jorgensen 
only receive local incarceration with a treatment option. (R., p.119.) An addendum 
to that report was filed one year later, asserting that Mr. Jorgensen had, in fact, 
absconded supervision, and changed the recommendation to a period of retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.129-30.) Mr. Jorgensen subsequently admitted the alleged 
violations. (R., p.131.) The district court entered a disposition conforming with the 
1 Mr. Jorgensen requested a transcript of this hearing, as well as transcripts of various 
other hearings which he believes are relevant to the issues on appeal. (See Motion to 
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed 
January 2, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion in regard to all but one 
of the requested transcripts. (Order, filed January 22, 2013.) 
2 While the judgment of conviction misstates the unified term of the sentence, it lists out 
the same fixed and indeterminate periods as the oral pronouncement. ( See 
R., pp.76 77; compare R., p.73.) The same error occurred when the district court 
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original recommendation, ordering that Mr. Jorgensen serve sixty days in local 
incarceration, and it added four years to the period of probation.3 (R., p.1 
Several months later, a third report of probation violation was filed, that 
Mr. Jorgensen had absconded supervision again. (R., pp.135-36.) An addendum was 
subsequently filed, but continued to recommend that the district court revoke 
and execute the underlying sentence. (R., pp.140-41.) Mr. Jorgensen admitted the 
new violations and the district court revoked his probation. (R., pp.142-45.) However, 
the district court again retained jurisdiction over Mr. Jorgensen. (R., p.145.) 
This time, Mr. Jorgensen was taken to the rider facility, where he a 
recommendation that be returned to probation. (Addendum to (hereinafter, 
APSI), cover letter.) During his period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Jorgensen had 
completed, or was anticipating completion of, ten different rehabilitation programs. 
(APSI, p.1.) He had no formal disciplinary sanctions, and only two informal sanctions, 
which occurred during the first few weeks he was in the program. (APSI, p.3; C-Notes 
attached to APSI, pp.4-5.) The district court returned Mr. Jorgensen to probation 
without a hearing. (R., pp.149-50.) The terms of his new probation indicated that 
Mr. Jorgensen had paid off all his outstanding fines and restitution. (R., p.152.) 
Several months later, the State filed a fourth report of probation violation. 
(R., pp.157-58.) Mr. Jorgensen admitted all but one of the allegations (which the State 
ultimately withdrew). (Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls. 7-10; Tr., Vol.2, p.5, Ls.12-18.)4 Defense 
revoked Mr. Jorgensen's probation. (See R., p.175.) However, the district court did 
ultimately enter an amended order correcting that error. (R., p.177.) 
3 Up to this point, the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson had been presiding on the case. 
After this point, the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling took over and presided over the 
remaining hearings. (See generally R.) 
4 The transcripts that were provided in this case are contained in two independently 
bound and paginated volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume 
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counsel filed a motion requesting the district court simply dismiss the as 
Mr. Jorgensen was only six months shy of completing the period of probation. 
(R., p.166; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.17 - p.7, L.11.) The prosecutor agreed that Mr. Jorgensen's 
period of probation would expire six months later, but opposed the motion to dismiss. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.1-'11 .) Jorgensen also addressed the district court, stating 
he was working to remain a productive member of society and that he did not present 
an ongoing threat thereto. , Vol.2, p.10, Ls.14-25.) He stated that his ultimate 
is to reach the position where he can be a productive part of his daughter's life. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.1-3.) 
The district court, however, considering the history Mr. Jorgensen had 
absconding supervision and the type of violations that had been alleged, decided to 
deny the motion to dismiss, revoke Mr. Jorgensen's probation, and execute the 
underlying sentence. (R., p.173; Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.6 - p.12, L.2.) Mr. Jorgensen timely 
appealed from that order {R., pp.179-81.) 
containing the transcript of the admit-deny hearing held on August 1, 2012. "Vol.2" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the disposition hearing held on 
September 6, 2012. 
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ISSUES 
1 the Idaho Court denied Mr. Jorgensen due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts 
for review of the on appeal. 
,Nhether the district court its discretion when it revoked Mr. Jorgensen's 





Whether The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Jorgensen Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
A Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, according to the 
United States Supreme Court, assures indigent defendants they will not be denied 
access to transcripts which are relevant to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So 
long as the record reflects a colorable need for such a transcript, the courts may not 
to provide that transcript unless the State proves that the transcript is not 
relevant to an issue raised on appeal. 
Mr. Jorgensen has raised a challenge to the decision to revoke his probation and 
execute his sentence, or, alternatively, to not reduce his sentence sua sponte when it 
did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be made part of the 
appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts from 
the change of plea hearing held on February 16, 2006, the sentencing hearing held on 
March 27, 2006, the probation violation hearing held on March 19, 2006, the probation 
violation hearing held on October 6, 2010, the probation violation hearing held on 
August 31, 2011, the probation violation hearing held on October 6, 2011, and the 
hearing on Mr. Jorgensen's motion for work release held on August 8, 2012. 
As such, Mr. Jorgensen is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of 
his request for these transcripts. Mr. Jorgensen asserts that the requested transcripts 
are relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his 
probation and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review 
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requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the 
proceedings in order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions. 
B. By Failing To Provide Mr. Jorgensen With Access To The Requested 
Transcripts, The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Jorgensen Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of 
His Claims 
The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law. 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; IDAH0 CONST. art I, § 13. Due process requires the defendant 
given notice and a meaningful opportunity to heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 1 ·1 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that 
judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham 
City, 452 U. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have 
been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of 
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute. See 
I. C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a); 
I.C.R. 54.7(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction 
and affects the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right. I.AR. 11 (c)(9); 
State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established. Its decisions have 
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established two fundamental themes. First, the of the due process and equal 
protection clauses is broad. disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not 
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, 
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. 
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial 
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript 
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that 
time, State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem. . .. Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on 
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
8 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. 
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript 
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative 
exists. Id. at 20. 
The United -..r<O,TQC, Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck 
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with 
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. See Bums v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held: 
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it 
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the 
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second 
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency. 
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible 
destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at 
258. 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court addressed how courts should 
go about determining whether defendants are entitled to certain transcripts. See 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). First, the defendant must make 
meritorious claims before transcripts will be provided at public expense. Id. at 494. The 
Court clarified its statement in Griffin - that a stenographic transcript is not relevant if an 
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equivalent alternative is available. Id. at 494-95. "[P]art or all of the stenographic 
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. 
at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the 
defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately 
concluded that the issues raised by those defendant could not be adequately reviewed 
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
The United States Supreme Couti continued to expand the protections identified 
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971 ). Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the 
requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id, If 
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary 
for the appeal. Id. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized 
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard. See, e.g., 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects 
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved 
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal 
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record. 
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The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Jorgensen Are Relevant To The Issues He 
Has Raised On Appeal. Because The Appellate Courts Independently Review 
The Entire Record Before The District Court VVhen Reviewing Decisions To 
Revoke Probation And Execute The Underlying Sentence Without Reduction 
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Jorgensen's claim that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed 
to uce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. "When we review a sentence that is 
into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon 
facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
original sentencing and the revocation of probation." v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
a district court's determinations regarding a defendant's sentence conducts an 
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports those 
decisions. Id. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not 
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 
665, 666 (1984). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an order revoking a 
defendant's probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked his probation, although it 
retained jurisdiction. Id. at 619-20. After the defendant completed his rider, the district 
court placed the defendant back on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked that 
probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the second order revoking probation. Id. 
11 
On appeal, the defendant in Morgan filed a motion to augment the appellate 
with transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which 
was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then challenged those 
decisions on appeal, asserting they deprived him of due process and equal protection. 
Id. 1. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation 
proceedings were not necessary of the appeal because "they were not before the 
district court in the second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave 
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during 
those proceedings."5 Id. at 1. The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of 
for a revocation determination: 
5 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address the defendant's claim that the 
Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the basis that it does not have 
the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. However, the 
Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed 
motion to augment, which contained information or argument not presented to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of Appeals after the case was assigned 
to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, _ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.22, pp.3-4 
(Ct. App. April 11, 2013) (not yet final); State v. Thompson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No.439, p.3 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013) (not yet final). This position is untenable because 
the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme 
Court and expressly prohibit separate filings in the Court of Appeals: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment to the Court of Appeals, the title of the proceeding 
and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed except that the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or other notations 
to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the case. All case 
filed shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
I.A.R. 110 (emphasis added). Furthermore, I.A.R. 30 requires all motions to augment 
be filed with the Supreme Court: 
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[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to an including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
However, whether or not transcripts of the requested proceedings were 
before the district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is irrelevant in 
regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal. In reaching a 
decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not limited to considering 
only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a 
court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and 
observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
I.AR. 30 (emphasis added). Mr. Jorgensen is not aware of any court rule which allows 
a party to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Since I.AR. 110 expressly 
prohibits such filings, the Morgan Court's statement that the defendant could have filed 
a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. Mr. Jorgensen recognizes that the facts in Morgan are similar to those 
in his case, but, as articulated infra, he disagrees with that decision, which should be 
overruled because it is directly contrary to the appellate rules. 
Mr. Jorgensen is also aware that the Court of Appeals has recently rejected the 
argument in regard to the applicability of the appellate rules. Cornelison, 2013 Opinion 
No.22, pp.3-6. However, Cornelison is not yet final and Mr. Jorgensen also disagrees 
with the holding in that case. 
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State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 ( 1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge 
in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. 
Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 1 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"). In fact, the 
Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only proper, but is actually expected 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
[the defendant] from the other case." State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 
·1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed at the time of the revocation 
hearing leading to the is irrelevant because the district court may rely upon the 
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
sentencing decision after revoking probation. 
The reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order 
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not 
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment 
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire 
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. 
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts. 
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the 
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the 
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does 
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were 
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived 
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but 
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive 
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be 
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do 
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
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State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant 
files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the 
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into 
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the 
events which occurred during those proceedings. 
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite 
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate 
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the 
district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition 
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the Couti of 
Appeals assumed the district court will automatically consider the prejudgment events 
when determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. 
Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is irrelevant, as an 
appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the events from the prior 
proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation. 
It is true, in this case, that two different district court judges presided over 
hearings. The Honorable Gregory S. Anderson presided over the initial hearings, 
including the change of plea hearing (R., pp.58-59), the original sentencing hearing 
(R., pp.72-74), the hearing on Mr. Jorgensen's Rule 35 motion (R., pp.87-88), the 
disposition hearing on the first report of probation violation (R., pp.100-02), and the rider 
review hearing (R., pp.112-13). The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling presided over the 
remaining hearings, which included the disposition hearing on the second report of 
probation violation (R., pp.131-32), the disposition hearing on the third report of 
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probation violation (R., pp.144-45), and the disposition hearing on the fourth report of 
probation violation (R., pp.171-72), from which Mr. Jorgensen appeals. As a result, 
Mr. Jorgensen should at least have been afforded the transcripts from the hearings over 
which Judge Shindurling presided, since it is from one of Judge Shindurling's decisions 
that Mr. Jorgensen has appealed. Downing, 1 Idaho at 373-7 4; Adams, 115 
Idaho at 1055-56; see also Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Gibson, 
106 Idaho at 495. 
However, the Court of Appeals' second rationale for appellate review of the entire 
record means that Mr. Jorgensen should have also received transcripts of the hearings 
presided over by Judge Anderson: 
[W]hen a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant 
has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is 
later revoked, and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue 
of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to 
adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not 
made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but 
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive 
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be 
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do 
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. The Adams Court made it clear that challenges to the 
excessiveness of the sentence should not be filed until the sentence is actually 
executed. Id. Therefore, in order to be sufficient for appellate review, the record needs 
to contain all the transcripts relating to the scope of the sentence, which includes the 
initial imposition of sentence, because they are relevant to that issue properly on 
appeal. Additionally, since the district court could have properly reduced 
Mr. Jorgensen's sentence at any of the hearings where it revoked his probation, see 
State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008), all the subsequent hearings are also 
relevant, and transcripts thereof are also necessary to the appellate record. As such, all 
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the transcripts that addressed the initial sentence or the decisions thereafter are 
relevant to the 
review. See, 
raised on appeal and should 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. 
provided to allow for sufficient 
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Jorgensen access to those transcripts 
constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, e.g., Mayer, 
404 U. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a verbatim transcript 
was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the courts improperly 
foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent defendants access to 
such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, U. 480-85 (1963). The United 
Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid . to prevent an indigent 
from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant 
must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural default: "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court."6 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
6 If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is 
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful 
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a 
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate 
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] 
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that 
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review, 
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the 
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection. 
In this case, the minutes only indicate whether some person was addressing the 
district court, not the contents of their statements. The contents of those statements, 
particularly the defendant's statements of allocution, are relevant to the excessive 
sentence claim. See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003). The 
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v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, (Ct. App. ·1996); State v. Repici, 1 Idaho 538, 541 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. ·1985). Therefore, if Mr. Jorgensen fails to provide the 
appellate court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal 
presumption will apply and Mr. Jorgensen's claims regarding the excessiveness of his 
sentence will not be addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of 
the Idaho Supreme Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive 
him of an effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process 
and equal protection grounds. Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85. 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access 
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due 
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that 
situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what occurred 
at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision 
to revoke probation. When Mr. Jorgensen was first placed on probation and given the 
missing transcripts in this case would contain such statements. (See, e.g., R., p.72 
(Mr. Jorgensen making a statement, potentially of allocution, at the initial sentencing 
hearing); R., p.101 (Mr. Jorgensen offering testimony regarding the alleged probation 
violations, potentially offering explanation or mitigation in that regard); R., pp.131-32 
(same); R., pp.142-43 (same); R., p.144 (Mr. Jorgensen making a statement, potentially 
of allocution, at a disposition hearing); R., p.164 (defense counsel arguing specific 
mitigation in regard to Mr. Jorgensen's application to the problem-solving courts). 
Therefore, the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these statements, are 
insufficient in this case to provide for adequate review. 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the minutes of the sentencing 
hearing reflect that Mr. Jorgensen had some concerns about proceeding with the 
sentencing hearing, but they do not indicate what those concerns were or how, if ever, 
they were allayed. (R., p.72.) Since this is the proper stage at which to raise 
challenges to the sentencing decisions, see, e.g., Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56, that 
transcript, at least, was necessary so that the hearing could be properly and effectively 
reviewed. This further demonstrates that the minutes are insufficient in this case to 
protect Mr. Jorgensen's due process and equal protection rights. 
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opportunity for multiple periods of probation the district court must have 
found, subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give 
Mr. Jorgensen the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, by placing Mr. Jorgensen 
on probation on each of those prior occasions, the district court must have determined 
that the mitigating factors presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented. 
I.C. § 1 1; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. such, to presume that the missing 
transcripts of those hearings supports the decision to relinquish jurisdiction ignores the 
mitigating factors that were present those hearings and presents a negative, one-
view of IVlr. Jorgensen. As a result, the denial of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented Mr. Jorgensen from addressing those positive factors in 
support of his appellate claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Jorgensen argues that the 
events which occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be presumed to 
invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to 
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate 
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all 
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not 
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on 
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As 
such, the decision to deny Mr. Jorgensen's request for the necessary transcripts will 
render his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the 
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missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Jorgensen's sentencing claims on the 
merits and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Jorgensen's request for those transcripts 
was denied, that presumption means that 
should be reversed. 
district court's sentencing decisions 
D. By Failing To Provide Mr. Jorgensen With Access To The Requested 
Transcripts, The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because 
He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, 
determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives 
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As 
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments 
to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The 
constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained 
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role 
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.; 
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see also Banuelos v. State, 1 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this the lack 
access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making 
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel 
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual 
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Jorgensen 
has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on merits of his 
claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for 
evaluating whether counsel effective assistance in a criminal action is 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 1 (1989) overruled on other grounds by Card, 
121 Idaho 425. These standards offer insight into the role and responsibilities of 
appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to 
advise Mr. Jorgensen on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. 
Mr. Jorgensen is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
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transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. ,Jorgensen his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Jorgensen's Probation, 
Or, Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte When It Did So 
A Introduction 
The record in this case indicates that, given a sufficient consideration of the 
relevant factors, Mr. Jorgensen remained an acceptable candidate for probation. As 
such, the district court's decision to revoke his probation constituted an abuse of 
discretion. Alternatively, Mr. Jorgensen's sentence should have been reduced when the 
district court revoked his probation. Therefore, because the district court abused its 
discretion, this Court should reverse the district court's order revoking probation and 
remand for a new disposition hearing, or, alternatively, reduce Mr. Jorgensen's 
sentence as it deems appropriate. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Jorgensen's Probation 
Mr. Jorgensen asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke 
probation and execute his unified sentences of ten years, with four years fixed, was an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is within the 
district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
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district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection 
of society. Id. In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered 
inquiry, determining "( 1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989)). 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard 
are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; 
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; 
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be 
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
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(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). These same factors are 
appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation. See 
State v. Sanchez, ·149 Idaho 102, ·106-07 (2009). 
In this several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Jorgensen. 
As a result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Jorgensen's probation was 
adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from 
Mr. Jorgensen through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 31 Therefore, this 
disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Mr. Jorgensen remained a good candidate for probation, though potentially in a 
more active supervision situation (such as some form of inpatient treatment program). 
Mr. Jorgensen told the district court he was trying to comply with the terms of his 
probation, and all the reported violations reveal is that he is human and fell short of his 
goals. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Jorgensen told the district court that he 
hoped to reach a situation where he could re-enter his daughter's life. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, 
Ls.1-3.) And, to that point, Mr. Jorgensen has demonstrated that he is capable of 
succeeding in rehabilitative programs. (See APSI, p.1 (noting that Mr. Jorgensen 
completed ten different rehabilitative programs during his period of retained 
jurisdiction).) He had, even before his most recent period of probation, paid off all his 
fines and restitution. (R., p.152.) 
Additionally, Mr. Jorgensen was only six months away from completing his period 
of probation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.11; Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.9-10.) Additionally, the 
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underlying charge was Mr. Jorgensen's first felony charge. (PSI, pp.2-3.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court "recognized that the first offender should accorded more lenient 
treatment than the habitual criminal." 
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 595, 
(1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 228 (1 ·1 )). This is because such a person not 
yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this point is more likely. 
Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Additionally, Mr. Jorgensen possesses employable skills, as 
well as the ability to maintain consistent employment. (PSI, p.6.) These two factors 
also indicate that he is not a continuing threat to society, but able to be a productive 
of society. Tr., Vol.2, p.10, 14-25.) As such, the decision to revoke 
probation constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. See Merwin, 131 Idaho 
at 648; l.C. § 19-2521. 
C. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion Revoking Probation 
Without Reducing Mr. Jorgensen's Sentence Sua Sponte When It Did So 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Jorgensen's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not reducing Mr. Jorgensen's sentence pursuant 
to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides to resume the execution of the 
underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce 
the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782. 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are the same 
as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 (identifying 
the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the district court needed to 
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sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating 
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 1 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should 
result in a more lenient sentence. e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
For same reasons the district court's of probation was an abuse of 
court's decision to not reduce its discretion Section 11(8), supra) the d 
Mr. Jorgensen's sentence sua sponte upon the revocation of probation constituted an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Jorgensen 
respectfully requests this Court vacate the order revoking his probation and executing 
his sentence and remand this case for a new disposition hearing. Alternatively, he 
respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this ih day of May, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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